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Special thanks to my wife Oksana and my daughter Kristina for their 
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Summary 
 
 
 
According to Article 2 UN Convention on Biological Diversity, 
biotechnology is "any technological application that uses biological systems, 
living organisms or derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or 
processes for specific use".
1
 Biotechnology is widespread in agriculture, 
food production and medicine. 
Agricultural biotechnology has been extensively applied in field crop 
production. It is one of the fastest adopted crop technology in recent history. 
2012 marked a hundredfold increase in genetically modified crops from 1.7 
million hectares in 1996 to 170 million hectares in 2012.
2
 
The term ‘genetically modified organism’ refers to an organism in which the 
genetic material has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally 
through fertilisation and/or natural recombination
3
. GMOs may be plants, 
animals or microorganisms, such as bacteria, parasites and fungi. In spite of 
the fact that the application of GMOs in agriculture has grown rapidly, the 
issue of socio-economic and environmental benefits of agricultural 
biotechnologies is rather controversial. There are conflicting arguments as to 
the implications of further commercialisation of GMOs.  
The research is important because the EU “remains far from speaking with 
one voice on agricultural biotechnology”.4 The purpose of research is to 
examine how science impacts EU decision-making in the field of GMOs, 
and how the law should deal with limitations of science. It is aimed at 
                                                 
1
 Article 2 UN Convention on Biological Diversity, retrieved from 
http://www.cbd.int/convention/text/ 
2
 The data retrieved from the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech 
Applications (ISAAA) Executive Summary on Global Status of Commercialized 
Biotech/GM Crops: 2012, available online on 
http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/44/executivesummary/ 
3
 There are slightly different definitions of the term ‘geneticall modified organism’, e.g.,  
‘an organism, with the exception of human beings, in which the genetic material has 
been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/or natural 
recombination’ (Article 2(2) of Deliberate Release Directive). 
4
 Lee, M. (2008). EU Regulation of GMOs. Law and Decision Making for a New Technology. 
Edward Elgar Publishing, p. 63. 
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examining the issue of interaction between the law and science. The 
research will focus on EU regulation of GMOs. The research will define and 
analyse the scientific features influencing EU regulation of GMOs, as well 
as the challenges and limitations posed by these features to the freedoms of 
internal market.  
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Abbreviations and acronims 
 
 
 
AG  
Codex 
CVMP 
Deliberate Release 
Directive 
 
 
EC Treaty  
ECJ or the Court   
EFSA  
EMEA  
 
EU courts  
 
 
FAO 
 
Food and Feed Regulation 
 
GC 
General Food Regulation 
 
 
 
 
GM 
GMO 
Advocate General 
Codex Alimentarius Commission 
Committee on Veterinary Medicinal Products 
Directive 2001/18 on the Deliberate Release 
into the Environment of Genetically Modified 
Organisms and Repealing Council Directive 
90/220/EEC [2001], OJ L 106/1 
Treaty Establishing the European Community 
Court of Justice of the European Union 
European Food Safety Authority 
European Agency for the Evaluation of 
Medicinal Products 
Court of Justice of the European Union and 
General Court of the European Union and 
Court of First Instance 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations 
Regulation 1829/2003 on Genetically 
Modified Food and Feed [2003] OJ L 268/1 
General Court of the European Union 
Regulation 178/2002 Laying Down the 
General Principles and Requirements of Food 
Law, Establishing the European Food Safety 
Authority and Laying Down Procedures in 
Matters of Food Safety [2002], OJ L 31/1 
genetically modified/genetic modification 
genetically modified organism 
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IARC 
JECFA 
 
International Agency for Research on Cancer 
Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food 
Additives
NGO 
TFEU 
 
Traceability and Labelling  
Regulation 
 
 
 
 
 
UN 
WHO 
WOAH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
non-governmental organisation 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union 
Regulation 1830/2003 concerning the 
Traceability and Labelling of Genetically 
Modified Organisms and the Traceability of 
Food and Feed products Produced from 
Genetically Modified Organisms and 
amending Directive 2001/18/EC [2003] OJ L 
268/24 
United Nations 
World Health Organization 
World Organization for Animal Health 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
 
 
The proposed research arises from the rapid development of agricultural 
biotechnology and its social and economic implications. The proposed 
research area is technical and complex. EU policy on health and the 
environment relies heavily on scientific evidence. According to paragraph 3 
Article 114 TFEU, European Commission aims at a high level of protection 
of human health and environment, taking into account new developments 
based on scientific facts. Integration of science in law through public policy 
brings on the science-based model of governance. The interrelation between 
scientific knowledge, economic interests and non-economic values is 
worthy of detailed research and explanation because law and science 
interpret facts in different ways.
5
 
The new technologies set up a specific, complicated, and essentially 
politicized problem for EU policy on health and the environment. This 
problem created by agricultural biotechnologies is that they bring about new 
environmental and health risks, which are of peculiar properties because of 
the uncertainty about their potential risks. This uncertainty hinders policy 
makers from application of ‘routine decision-making procedures for risk 
assessment and management. It impedes the application of standard 
scientific approaches and pushes regulatory decision-making into a more 
political direction’.6 In the area of agricultural biotechnologies, national 
differences in risk regulation might set off political and trade conflicts 
(discussed in Chapter III). Indeed, EU environmental law involves various 
                                                 
5
 Brosnan, D. (Fall 2007). Science, Law, and the Environment: the Making of a Modern 
Discipline. Environmental Law, Vol. 37 Issue 4, pp. 987-1006. 
6
 Falkner, R., & Jaspers, N. (2012, February). Regulating Nanotechnologies: Risk, 
Uncertainty and the Global Governance Gap. Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 12 Issue 
1, pp. 30-55. 
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non-economical interests. The precautionary principle of EU policy on 
environment is linked up to the science-based model of governance. There 
are some gaps in the current research on the use of science in regulatory 
processes. This research aims to create a specialized and detailed legal 
account of the role of science in relation to GMOs.  
European institutions governing the environmental issues have extensively 
used scientific knowledge in decision-making process. The Commission’s 
officials deal with scientific data. The role of courts in shaping scientific 
expertise used in EU decision-making process cannot be underestimated. 
Contrary to common knowledge, EU environmental risk regulation is not a 
product of legislative interventions ‘but the result of a rich and informed 
case-law developed by EU courts in recent years’.7 Since the impact of 
scientific data on judicial decision making tends to increase, I will examine 
how the courts deal with measurement of scientific uncertainty. 
In the field of environmental law, the doctrine of risk regulation is 
concerned with the governance of risks to health and safety, weighed up 
against economic interests such as the cost of regulatory measures and their 
potential negative impact on trade.
8
 In other words, a health protection 
measure can affect trade negatively, as well as trade liberalisation can affect 
health protection interests. 
The added value of the research will be the elaboration on the role of 
science in EU environmental decision making. The research is important 
since the environmental risk management and proper application of EU 
policy on environment depends on whether EU officials and judges handle 
these issues in a way that follows on objectivity provided by scientific 
evidence, ‘over the more evaluative and more obviously manipulable 
political concerns provoked by GMOs’.9 An essential requirement for 
effective environmental policy is knowledge about what sorts of scientific 
data is relevant and useful and how to interpret, evaluate, and draw 
                                                 
7
 Alemanno, A. (2009, January 1). The Shaping of European Risk Regulation by Community 
Courts. The Jean Monnet Working Papers, n. 18/2008. 
8
 See, to that extent, Holder, J., Lee, M. & Elworthy, S. (2007). Environmental Protection, 
Law and Policy: Text and Materials. In Law in Context (2nd Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
9
 Ibid, p. 198. 
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conclusions from such data. There is an opinion that many lawyers typically 
do not have this knowledge
10
, even though TFEU emphasizes the 
importance of available scientific and technical data in preparing EU policy 
on environment.
11
 The current level of knowledge and development 
achieved in the research on the role of scientific evidence, uncertainty and 
the precautionary principle in regulation of GMOs has not been studied 
exhaustively and comprehensively yet.
12
 
 
 
1.1. Purpose and main objectives of the 
research  
 
The purpose of the research is to examine how the scientific expertise has 
been applied and how the scientific evidence has been interpreted by EU 
courts and policymakers in the field of EU policy on health and the 
environment. Generally, I aim to study what opportunities are offered by 
science to the law, how scientific risk assessment affects EU decision-
making, and how the law should deal with limitations of science. 
Specifically, I will focus on the legal framework of EU regulation of GMOs 
with regard to the role of science in judicial decision making. The research 
will define and analyse the scientific features influencing EU regulation of 
GMOs, as well as the challenges and limitations posed by these features to 
the freedoms of the internal market. 
                                                 
10
 See Tanford, J.A. (1990). The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and 
Psychology. 66 Indiana Law Jornal 137, 144-145; Dobbins, S. et al. (2002). Applying 
Daubert: How Well Do Judges Understand Science and Scientific Method? 85 Judicature 
244, 247; Dobbins, S. et al. (2001). Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey Of Judges 
On Judging Expert Evidence In A Post- Daubert World. 25 Law & Human Behaviour, 433. 
11
 First indent paragraph 3 Article 191 TFEU. 
12
 For specialized research on the precautionary principle, science and uncertainty in the 
GMO debate and regulation of GMOs, see relevant works of M. Lee, B. Wynne, S. 
Jasanoff, J. Tait, L. Levidow, S. Carr, D. Wield, a list is available in bibliography of this 
thesis. 
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I aim to understand how scientific evidence has been interpreted and how 
scientific uncertainty has been weighed by EU courts against the internal 
market freedoms. I will analyse the role which science plays in legitimising 
barriers to the internal market. EU courts aim at reconciling contraries 
between purely science-based decision-making and highly politicised 
precautionary rhetoric involving emotional discourse. Striking a balance 
between scientific and political legitimacy, ECJ specified that risk to health 
or environment must be established on new evidence based on reliable 
scientific data.
13
 The doubts have been raised about the Court’s capability to 
demonstrate that certain environmental and health protection measures 
‘were actually proportionate and justified for simple scientific reasons’14. It 
is indeed difficult to define the criteria under which a restrictive measure 
can be proved as proportionate and theoretically substantiated. There have 
been the claims that the ECJ ‘has never really taken care to define the 
necessity/proportionality test it applies’.15 The case law illustrates a risk 
philosophy which may favour (or otherwise) scientific evidence as a 
legitimate factor of restrictive measures. Since science is considered as the 
prime source of authority in EU decision-making on agricultural 
biotechnology,
16
 the line of case-law concerning GMOs is worthy of close 
scrutiny. I will examine the judicial approach to measures banning or 
restricting GMOs. In particular, I will asses such measures on the basis of 
the following conditions: absence of less restrictive measure; a protection 
measure must prove to be necessary to reach the goal of protection of health 
and the environment; a measure must be based on scientific evidence. 
In the EU, the problem of environmental and human health risks is primarily 
addressed through governmental regulations.
17
 Scientific assessment of 
                                                 
13
 Joined Cases C-58/10 to C-68/10 Monsanto SAS and others. 
14
 Laffineur, J. (2010) First ECJ Ruling on REACH: Choosing Registration over Exemption - 
Case C-558/07, R v Secretary of States for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. 
Journal of Environmental Law Vol. 22, 135-146. 
15
 Notaro, N. (2000) The New Generation Case Law on Trade and Environment, 25 
European Law Review 5. 
16
 For detailed discussion on this issue see Lee, M. (2008), supra note 4, pp. 85-98. 
17
 Covello, V. & Mumpower, J. (1985). Risk Analysis and Risk Management: A Historical 
Perspective. 5(2) Risk Analysis 103. 
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health and environmental risk lies within the technical paradigm
18
, also 
referred to as the objectivist school
19
. As a positivist concept, objectivism 
considers risks which are not supported by the technical calculations as 
clearly erroneous.
20
 The issue here is that EU legislation on GMOs is open 
to opposing explanations, which raises doubts about the adequacy of 
technical risk assessment paradigm as the main approach to decision-
making. Nevertheless, EU environmental policy relies heavily on technical 
scientific approaches to risk.
21
  
It appears that science alone is not a universal guide for dealing with 
extremely sensitive issues. It has been noted that the stalemates in the 
regulation of agricultural biotechnologies ‘in part are the inevitable result of 
exclusive reliance on different kinds of specialisation such as scientific risk 
assessment’,22 and that ‘decision making is not the burden that falls upon 
scientists but is assumed by the public at large’.23 The procedure of 
authorization of GMOs shows that errors or contradictions in an opinion 
issued by expert institution like EFSA can challenge the legitimacy of 
European institutions.
24
 Authorization based on unsubstantiated or deficient 
risk assessment has implications for the legality of the Commission. 
The scientific validity of EU regulation of GMOs has been often questioned 
and heavily criticized.
25
 It appears that the question of scientific credibility 
                                                 
18
 Ortwin, R. (1992) Concepts of Risk: A Classification. In Krimsky, S. & Golding, D. (Eds.) 
Social Theories of Risk. Praeger, Westport, Conn. 
19
 Gruszchynski, L. (2010) Regulating Health and Environmental Risks under WTO Law. A 
Critical Analysis of the SPS Agreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
20
 Van Asselt, M. (2000) Perspectives in Uncertainty and Risk. PRIMA Approach to Decision 
Support, p. 152. 
21
 Risk assessment ‘shall be based on the available scientific evidence and undertaken in 
an independent, objective and transparent manner’, Article 6(2) Regulation 178/2002 
Laying Down the General Principles and Requirements of Food Law, Establishing the 
European Food Safety Authority and Laying Down Procedures in Matters of Food Safety 
[2002] OJ L 31/1. 
22
 Somsen, H. The editor’s preface in Lee, M. (2008), supra note 4. 
23
 Rajan, R. & Letourneau, D. (2012). What Risk Assessments of Genetically Modified 
Organisms Can Learn from Institutional Analyses of Public Health Risks. Journal of 
Biomedicine & Biotechnology, pp. 1-8, at 1. 
24
 Action brought to General Court on 27 May 2010 — Hungary v Commission (Case T-
240/10). EFSA’s opinion granting authorization for cultivation of genetically modified 
potato was contradicting to the views of WHO and European Medicines Agency. 
25
 For an analysis of critical claims, see, e.g., Davison, J. (2010, February). GM plants: 
Science, politics and EC regulations. Plant Science. Vol. 178, issue 2, pp. 94-98; Scott, J. 
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of environmental policy has often involved complex political and economic 
choices. The GMOs authorisation involves the Commission as well as the 
Member States. It is obvious that such a decision-making process is political 
to a large extent. Therefore, I will examine the legitimate grounds for EU 
environmental decision-making from the perspective of the role of non-
scientific factors in the process of risk assessment and their impact on the 
objective value of scientific data within the system of EU regulation. 
Therefore, the central research question is: What is the role of scientific 
evidence in EU regulation of GMOs? The following sub-questions will help 
to answer the central research question and to substantiate the research 
findings: How EU courts interpret scientific data? To which extent EU 
courts apply the principles of precautionary and proportionality on the 
basis of scientific evidence? What are the implications of non-scientific 
interests in EU courts’ jurisprudence? 
 
 
1.2. Research problem 
 
The precautionary principle, on which EU policy on environment shall be 
based, involves due consideration of scientific data. It addresses the cases 
where scientific evidence is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and 
preliminary scientific evaluation indicates that there are the reasonable 
grounds for concern that potentially dangerous effects on the environment 
and health may be inconsistent with the high level of protection.
26
 
Therefore, in case of scientific uncertainty the errors should be skewed 
towards safety
27, in spite of claims that the precautionary principle “is 
                                                                                                                            
(2007). The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
26
 Communication from the Commission of 2 February 2000 on the precautionary principle 
[COM(2000) 1 final]. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/library/pub/pub07_en.pdf 
27
 Cameron, J. (1999). The Precautionary Principle. In Sampson, G. and Chambers, B., 
(Eds.), Trade, Environment and Millennium. New York: UN University Press. 
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hopelessly vague”.28 It follows that environmental decision-making involves 
a careful consideration of scientific uncertainties. Besides, EU governance 
regarding biotechnologies allows for a broad input of non-scientific 
(political, social) factors into decision-making process, which can entail 
serious consequences. For example, the public policy can be exercised on 
the basis of values rather than on the basis of empirical evidence (like in 
Commission v Poland,
 29
 discussed in paragraph 3.3).  
The methodology of EU risk regulation comprises three stages: risk 
assessment, risk management and risk communication. Such a division 
suggests a differentiation between scientific (assessment) and political 
(management) aspects of risk regulation, which is compatible with the 
approach adopted by courts in assessment of the legality of restrictive 
measures inspired by public health goals
30
. In this form, the risk regulation 
provides for the legal framework where EU legislators and courts seek for 
balance between the objectives of environmental protection and the 
freedoms of internal market
31
. Moreover, the practical meaning of division 
between risk evaluation and management has increasingly been disputed as 
artificial, leading to exclusion of other sources of information necessary for 
decision-making. As a result, EU regulatory institutions face the dilemma of 
a clash between science and politics, where the courts have to find out how 
to reconcile these, often contradictory, elements of risk regulation. 
Scientific advancement is rapid. It progresses faster than governmental 
ability to grasp the implications of technological challenges. Technological 
inventions are produced at a rate which far outpaces the possibilities of legal 
control.
32
 This is especially appropriate for new technologies like 
agricultural biotechnologies whose progress is ‘faster and more difficult to 
                                                 
28
 Sunstein, C. (2005). Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle. Cambrigde: 
Cambridge University Press, p. 26. 
29
 Case C-165/08 Commission v Poland [2009] ECR I-6843. 
30
 Opinion of Advocate General Mischo in Case 192/01 Commission v Denmark [2003] ECR 
9693, paragraph 143. 
31
 Article 6 (1) of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of 28 January 2002 states that “food law 
shall be based on risk analysis”. 
32
 Weeramantry, C.G. (1997). Justice without Frontiers: Protecting Human Rights in the Age 
of Technology, (Vol. 1). Kluwer Law International, The Hague, p. 72. 
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regulate compared to traditional technologies’.33 The regulatory challenges 
of modern biotechnologies have significant societal meaning. The proposed 
research arises from the rapid development of agricultural biotechnology 
and its social and economic implications. While the central research 
problem is applicable to agricultural technologies as a whole, the present 
thesis is specifically about regulation of GMOs. The research area is 
technically complicated. Therefore, risk assessments in this area ‘are made 
more complex and contentious by both their inherent uncertainty and the 
inevitability of failure beyond expectation in complex systems’.34 The 
proposed research seeks for analysis of the regulatory approaches and 
judicial interpretation of scientific evidence as it has been developed in the 
area of EU GMOs regulation. In particular, the analysis aims to bring 
legally relevant facts established by scientific evidence into focus of the 
biotechnical decision making balancing between the interests of trade and 
health protection.  
 
 
1.3. Research Method 
 
The thesis is based on legal dogmatic method applied through the utilization 
of quantitative and qualitative analysis of the research texts. The number of 
questions arisen from the central research problem is inexhaustible. Besides 
the mentioned ones, the research problem can raise other questions as well 
(for example, what are the common scientific features of risk assessment 
techniques applicable within the system of EU regulation of agricultural 
biotechnology and food safety? What are the possibilities of scientific risk 
assessment to contribute to political legitimacy of EU? What is the impact 
of differences in standards of scientific uncertainty on the outcome of 
                                                 
33
 Boisson de Chazournes, L. (2009). New Technologies, the Precautionary Principle, and 
Public Participation. In Thérèse Murphy (Ed.) New technologies and human rights, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.  162. 
34
 Rajan, R. & Letourneau, D. (2012), supra note 23, at 1. 
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decision-making in the field of biotechnologies?). Apparently, the present 
study can consequently lead to a number of other important questions, 
which may be answered by means of further research. Thus, the data 
analysis is a systematic search for the meaning that implies organizing and 
interrogating data in a way that allows the researchers to see patterns, 
identify themes, discover relationships, develop explanations, make 
interpretations, mount cirques, or generate theories.
35
 
 
 
1.4. The research design, measurement of 
standards, and data collection 
 
The spectrum of GMO research is broad. The study of biotechnologies 
operates in a variety of contexts: law, public policy, European studies, 
sociology etc. The previous works in risk regulation and GMOs have been 
more focused on the role of public, its involvement in regulatory process, 
democratisation of authorisation procedures etc (e.g., Wynne, Maasen, 
Weingart, Levidow, Jasanoff).
 36
 At the same time, despite a relatively large 
number of researches in the field of regulation of GMOs, the systematic 
theoretical studies employing consistent analytical approach towards the 
                                                 
35
 Hutch, A. (2002). Doing qualitative research in education settings. New York: State 
University of New York Press.  
36
 See, e.g., Bengtsson, B. & Klintman, M. (2010). Stakeholder participation in the EU 
governance of GMO in the food chain. In Bäckstrand, K., Khan, J., Kronsell, A. & 
Lovbrand, E. (Eds.) Environmental Politics and Deliberative Democracy: Examining the 
Promise of New Modes of Governance. Edward Elgar Pub: 105–122; Ferreti, M.P. (2008). 
Participatory Strategies in the Regulation of GMO Products in the EU. In Steffek, J., 
Kissling, C. & Nanz, P. (Eds). Civil Society Participation in European and Global 
Governance: A Cure for the Democratic Deficit? (First Ed.). Palgrave Macmillan: 166–184; 
Fischer, F. (2009). Democracy and expertise: reorienting policy inquiry. Oxford University 
Press; Hagendijk, R. & Irwin, A. (2006). Public Deliberation and Governance: Engaging 
with Science and Technology in Contemporary Europe. Minerva, 44(2), 167–184; 
Maasen, S., & Weingart, P. (Eds.). (2005). Democratization of Expertise? (Vol. 24). 
Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag; Wynne B. et al. (2001). Public Attitudes towards 
Agricultural Biotechnologies in Europe (PABE). Final report of project with five partners 
country teams (Spain, Italy, Germany, France, the UK), funded by DG-Research, Brussels. 
Centre for the Study of Environmental Change (CSEC), Lancaster University. Retrieved 
from: http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fss/projects/ieppp/pabe/docs/pabe_finalreport.doc 
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impact of science on the EU environmental policy is still lacking. I aim to 
create a specialized and detailed legal account about the role of science in 
the field of EU regulation of GMOs. 
 
 
Table 1. Public opinion about GM food.
37
 
 
 
 
 
There are wide choices of empirical sources for research in relation to EU 
regulation of biotechnologies. In fact, the thesis is based on legal desk 
research through utilization of an instrumental perspective, which is used, 
for example, in order to find out the means to secure the EU law’s 
“effectiveness”. It looks at the tools and techniques which the specific 
relevant actors have. This perspective also brings in a normative discussion 
on how the EU goals, rules, procedures and institutional structure can be 
                                                 
37
 Eurobarometer, October 2010, retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_341_en.pdf 
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brought into better agreement with each other.
38
 The cases selected for study 
are developed around applications for GMO authorization. The case law 
analysis is especially relevant since it involves the complex regulatory 
procedures and societal controversies across scientific uncertainties and 
risks.  
The specific relevant actors are:
39
 
- risk producers – those pursuing potentially hazardous activities 
or technologies; 
- risk assessors – scientific experts, EFSA in particular;  
- risk managers – the European Council and Commission and the 
Member States; 
- risk protesters – those objecting new technologies or activities 
through lobbying, protesting and critical reports;  
- risk reviewers – EU courts. 
In order to come up with the challenges of application of the precautionary 
principle and to understand how scientific uncertainty is assessed and 
interpreted in the area of EU regulation of GMOs, I will use a variety of 
sources. I will research information from academic literature, journal 
articles, documents of European institutions. I will analyze relevant EU law, 
with a special focus on the courts’ case law. I will examine the role of 
science in shaping judicial decisions and influencing legislation. The 
thorough examination of EU courts’ case law will help to define the 
characteristics of the European model of scientific risk regulation. I will 
address the effects of EU courts’ judgments on the development of EU 
environmental law through the analysis of jurisdictional interpretation of 
science in justification of restrictive measures to free trade.  
The present analysis involves “working with data, organizing them, 
breaking them into manageable units, synthesizing them, searching for 
patterns, discovering what is important and what is to be learned, and 
                                                 
38
 Snyder, F. (1993). The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, 
Processes, Tools and Techniques, 56 Modern Law Review, p. 19-54.  
39
 Ravetz, J.R. (2001). Models of risk: An exploration. In Hisschemöller, M., Hoppe, R., 
Dunn, W.N. & Ravetz, J.R. (Eds). Knowledge, power and participation in environmental 
policy analysis. London: Transaction Books. 
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deciding what you will tell others”.40 In other words, the current research 
represents the investigation of conditions facilitating analysis of impact of 
scientific evidence on EU regulation of GMOs within the theoretical 
framework of risk regulation. 
 
 
1.5. Restrictions of the research 
 
The primary methodological challenge to the outcome of the research is the 
issue of integration of the natural science perspectives in the legal field as a 
social science study. The core methodological problem of the research is 
how to connect biotechnology and GMOs in particular as natural 
phenomena with social and economic phenomena, like health and food 
safety, economic development, internal market freedoms etc. In other 
words, the main methodological concern is the question of integration and 
unification of natural and social sciences perspectives in the study. The legal 
concept of knowledge is not identical to the scientific concept. In the field of 
environmental law, the legal facts are closely linked to the principle of 
precautionary and based therefore on the scientific information. A possible 
way of correlation of terms is ‘problem-feeding’, which ‘is a common and 
apparently fruitful way of connecting disparate disciplines’.41 It is possible 
to apply this concept to the research in order to analyse how problems are 
defined by natural sciences and exported to the law. The feeding of 
scientific issue into the field of environmental law is developed by 
correlation of terms inherent in both science and law. The relevant legal 
terms are not necessarily the same as scientific facts and they can be 
                                                 
40
 Bogdan, R. & Biklen, S. (1992). Qualitative Research for Education: An Introduction to 
Theory and Methods (2nd ed.). Toronto: Allyn and Bacon, p. 157. 
41
 Thorén, H. & Persson, J. (2011). Philosophy of Interdisciplinarity: Problem‐Feeding, 
Conceptual Drift, and Methodological Migration. In 3rd Biennial Conference of the 
Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice (June 22-24, 2011; Exeter, UK), retrieved 
from http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu.ludwig.lub.lu.se/8670/1/Thoren_Persson_Philosophy_of_interdisciplina
rity_draft_June2011.pdf? 
18 
 
inconsistent therefore. The ‘problem-feeding’ method would complement 
legal desk research by identifying the limitations inherent in science and law 
and defining the extent of scientific data relevance to legal issues. It would 
be useful to analyse such discrepancies between science and law by 
applying an analytical framework based on epistemology and ontology
42
. 
According to Lena Walberg, problem-feeding from law to science is 
difficult because the understanding of causation in the two fields differ. The 
correlation of terms (or the ontological differences corresponding to legally 
relevant facts and scientifically relevant facts) is only superficially in place. 
The attempts to establish causal relations in both fields are liable to give rise 
to misconceptions about the opportunities for problem-feeding.  
Ontologically, scientific versus legal facts are disposed to a different set of 
entities relevant to scientific versus legal theory. Science and law are also, 
correspondingly, disposed to different epistemologies, where legal dogmatic 
method makes ‘knowledge (or part of it) a phenomenon that is bestowed on 
men and vouchsafed by higher powers and authorities’43, while scientific 
method gives greater emphasis to the empirical self-groundedness of 
knowledge, involving experiment and experience: cogito ergo sum. In other 
words, legal knowledge as a rule is derived by logic from the general 
principles of law, rights, and freedoms, whereas scientific knowledge is 
derived from experience and experiment.  
Apparently, the field of environmental law offers unique opportunities for 
integration and unification of natural and social sciences perspectives. Such 
a methodological approach is very advanced and time-consuming and it 
goes far beyond the empirical limits of the present thesis. This issue will be 
possible to elaborate on during further research.  
Besides, the data collection is limited to gathering information from the 
official sources. Moreover, the research easily becomes outdated since the 
concerned developments are rapid.  
                                                 
42
 See, to that extent, Wahlberg, L. (2010). Legal Questions and Scientific Answers: 
Ontological Differences and Epistemic Gaps in the Assessment of Causal Relations. Diss. 
Lund University. 
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 Gouldner, A. (1976). The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology. London: The Macmillan 
Press LTD, p. 26. 
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A significant challenge to the research is that it is difficult to define 
beforehand what level of risk generally justifies the application of measures 
in accordance with the precautionary principle. As AG Mengozzi 
mentioned, ‘[c]ase-law couched in abstract terms would be of little or no use 
for the decisions which must be taken in practice’,44 since the risk 
assessment has been carried out on a case-by-case basis. 
In spite of different pitfalls inherent in any research, there are no stringent 
algorithms or demands on data processing in a research since analysis is “as 
much art as science”.45 The present research, utilizing mainly information 
from official sources, aims at optimizing the procedure of data collection in 
order to reduce the research errors within available time. For this purpose, 
the optimal data collection method is a combination of two or more methods 
of data collection in order to address the problem of data reliability.
46
 
 
 
1.6. Structure of the thesis 
 
The issue of GMOs involves a broad range of concerns. In order to arrange 
the arguments and findings in a substantial and coherent way, this thesis is 
structured as follows. Chapter I provides for the introductory description of 
the central research issue, explains the purpose and object of the research. 
Besides, Chapter I elaborates on the research strategy, develops the 
methodology of current study and discusses the research design. It explains 
the research strategy and methodology of the present study in order to connect 
the research questions to methods and to discover what tools and procedures 
will be used in answering these questions. It explains the chosen methodology 
of data analysis through amalgam of such methods as legislation analysis and 
accessory informational data analysis. The chapter also examines the 
                                                 
44
 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in Joined cases C-58/10 to C-68/10 Monsanto 
SAS and others, paragraph 67. 
45
 Babbie, E. (2007). The practice of social research. Thomson Learning, Inc, p. 384. 
46
 Leeuw, D. (2005). To Mix or Not to Mix Data Collection Modes in Surveys. Journal of 
Official Statistics, Vol. 21, No. 2.  
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advantageous and disadvantageous points of represented methodology. This 
chapter presents a way to answer the main research question, describing what 
kinds of information are necessary to collect for the analytical part of research, 
and which consecutive steps are needed to be done in order to answer the main 
research question. Chapter II outlines the theoretical framework of 
investigation. It explains the risk regulation doctrine as a theoretical concept 
relevant to EU regulation of GMOs. Chapter III describes the framework for 
GMOs authorization as an important tool of scientific risk assessment since 
authorisation is required for every GM product. It explains the nature of 
conflict between science, policy and public in decision making on GMO. 
The legislation on GMOs authorisation is analysed along these lines of 
conflict. Besides, Chapter III contains case law analysis. It expounds 
appropriate cases from EU courts in order to explain how courts interpret 
scientific uncertainty about possible negative effects of GMO. It also 
analyses how court assesses the interests of health and environment 
protection against the freedoms of internal market. Chapter IV concludes 
this thesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework for the current research. The 
background and specifics of EU regulation of GMOs is described. In order 
to develop the sufficient framework for the further analysis, the present 
chapter substantiates relevance and applicability of theoretical concepts of 
risk regulation for the research. The meaning and scope of application of the 
principle of precautionary and the proportionality principle in relation to 
environmental risk regulation is explained. Different interpretations of risk 
related to regulation of GMOs presented in academic literature and 
documents of EU institutions are discussed. The chapter also explains 
relevance of the concept of risk regulation and how it is used in the present 
research. This concept gives the views on what the desired conditions for 
functioning of the regulation of GMOs are. 
 
 
2.1. Regulation of risk as relevant 
theoretical concept of regulatory 
framework applying to GMOs 
 
The dominant realm of risk regulation is judicial review of decisions of 
public institutions
47
. Besides, risk regulation has been a central issue of 
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 Rodgers, W. (1987). Guerilla decisionmaking: Judicial review of risk assessments. Journal 
of Hazardous Materials, 15  205-217. 
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research for many prominent scholars.
48
 It is mentioned above that the 
methodology of EU risk regulation comprises three stages: risk assessment, 
risk management and risk communication
49
. In fact, the concept of risk 
regulation is far more nuanced,
 50
 but it is outside of the scope of the present 
thesis to analyse the specifics of risk peculiar to different fields of social 
sciences, since the present study is predominantly concerned with the role of 
science in the field of EU regulation of GMOs.  
Probably, no regulatory framework that addresses only ‘risk side’ of 
agricultural biotechnologies can adequately and comprehensively address 
the complexity of GMOs issues. Nevertheless, as it is previously mentioned, 
the present research covers only the framework of risk regulation in relation 
to the role of scientific evidence in the field of regulation of GMOs. The 
three ‘interconnected components of risk analysis – risk assessment, risk 
management and risk communication – ‘provide a systematic methodology 
for the determination of effective, proportionate and targeted measures or 
other actions to protect health’51.  
 The breakdown of risk regulation to the mentioned three ‘distinct but 
closely linked’ elements was proposed by the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, a body established in 1963 by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO). The Codex’s standards are collected in Procedural 
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 For example, Jasanoff, S. (1990). The fifth branch: Science advisers as policy makers. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Wynne, B. (1995). Technology assessment and 
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manual
52
, comprising international standards, guidelines and 
recommendations relevant to food production and food safety. Countries are 
expected to follow these standards and recommendations in devising food 
safety regulations.
53
 
The term ‘environmental risk assessment’ is understood as the evaluation of 
risks to human health and the environment, whether direct or indirect, 
immediate or delayed, which the deliberate release or the placing on the 
market of GMOs may pose.
54
  
 
 
Table 2: Elements of risk analysis
55
 
 
Risk assessment 
 
A scientifically based process consisting of hazard 
identification; hazard characterization; exposure 
assessment; risk characterization.  
Risk management  
 
The process, distinct from risk assessment, of 
weighing policy alternatives in consultation with all 
interested parties, considering risk assessment and 
other factors relevant for the health protection of 
consumers and for the promotion of fair trade 
practices, and, if needed, selecting appropriate 
prevention and control options. 
Risk communication  
 
The interactive exchange of information and 
opinions throughout the risk analysis process 
concerning risk, risk-related factors and risk 
perceptions, among risk assessors, risk managers, 
consumers, industry, the academic community and 
other interested parties, including the explanation 
of risk assessment findings and the basis of risk 
management decisions. 
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 Codex Alimentarius Commission – Procedural manual – Twelfth Edition, 2001. 
Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, FAO, Rome. Retrieved 
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 Winickoff, D., Bushey, D. (2010). Science and Power in Global Food Regulation: The 
Rise of the Codex Alimentarius. Science Technology Human Values 2010 35: 356. 
54
 Article 2(8) of Directive 2001/18 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of 
Genetically Modified Organisms and Repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC [2001] OJ L 
106/1. 
55
 Codex Alimentarius Commission – Procedural manual, supra note 52, p.43-44. 
24 
 
The principles of risk analysis in relation to GM food were established by 
adoption of a new General Food Regulation in 2002.
56
 It sets out general 
principles of food law, establishes the structures and mechanisms for the 
scientific and technical evaluations which are undertaken by the European 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA). The General Food Regulation defines risk 
as ‘a function of the probability of an adverse health effect and the severity 
of that effect, consequential to a hazard’.57 This regulation adheres to strong 
science in measures relating to food safety and also establishes the three 
aforementioned components of risk regulation (assessment, management 
and communication). It was mentioned before that the practical meaning of 
division between risk evaluation and risk management has been disputed as 
artificial, in the sense that the Commission generally treats the opinion of 
the EFSA as a result of both risk assessment and risk management, and not 
just risk assessment.
58
 This may partially be a reason why so far the final 
decision on authorization has always been in line with EFSA’s opinion59. 
According to the General Food Regulation, scientific assessment of risk 
must be undertaken in an independent, objective and transparent manner 
based on the best available science. Risk management is the process of 
weighing policy alternatives in the light of results of a risk assessment and, 
if required, selecting the appropriate actions necessary to prevent, reduce or 
eliminate the risk to ensure the high level of health protection determined as 
appropriate in the EU. In the risk management phase, the decision makers 
need to consider a range of information in addition to the scientific risk 
assessment. These include, for example, the feasibility of controlling a risk, 
the most effective risk reduction actions depending on the part of the food 
supply chain where the problem occurs, the practical arrangements needed, 
the socio-economic effects and the environmental impact.  
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 Regulation 178/2002, supra note 21. 
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 Ibid, Article 3(9). 
58
 Bengtsson, B. & Klintman, M. (2010), supra note 36.  
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The General Food Regulation states that EFSA is ‘an independent scientific 
point of reference in risk assessment’.60 Therefore, the Regulation tries to 
consolidate the EFSA’s independent scientific position in attempt to gain 
legitimate weight from the EFSA’s expertise. 
The General Food Regulation also establishes the principle that risk 
management actions are not just based on a scientific assessment of risk but 
also take into consideration a wide range of other factors legitimate to the 
matter under consideration. The EFSA plays its role in the separation of 
scientific excellence from political and business considerations, which can 
pose a threat to the internal market. The internal market freedoms are 
particularly sensible to the regulation of risk in the field of application of 
GMOs, because this area is lacking for harmonized and objective approach. 
In the academic field, the discussion of relationships between science and 
politics seems to have no ending. Scientific expertise develops in a 
particular cultural and political context that inevitably (and often 
unconsciously) impacts the scientific expertise of decision making. While 
expertise is certainly important, public perspective on risk deserves 
thorough consideration. The dichotomy between expert and public 
perspectives is theoretically explained by two approaches to risk: the 
technocratic and the populist
61. The ‘technocrats’ clam superiority of 
science over public opinion, while ‘populists’ believe that in a democracy 
government should follow public opinion rather than a will of self-
appointed technocratic elite. Both technocrats and populists acknowledge 
that science is not flawless in terms of public policy deliberation concerning 
the environmental protection for the reasons of scientific uncertainty. 
Apparently, science alone is not a universal guide for dealing with 
extremely sensitive issues of risk regulation in the field of new technologies. 
That is where ‘sacred’ expertise clashes with ‘profane’ public opinion on 
possible harms of GMOs. This is why the last phase of risk communication 
is important, being an exchange of information between various 
stakeholders, shaping that what Jürgen Habermas calls ‘communicative 
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 Regulation 178/2002, supra note 21, Recital 34. 
61
 For more information of these two approaches see Sunstein, C., The Laws of Fear (2001 
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rationality’. The risk communication concerning decision-making on GMOs 
therefore pursues the goal to achieve full transparency and authentic mutual 
understanding, to realize a public interest in a context of multi-governance 
approach to EU regulation of GMOs. Lack of communicative rationality in 
form of transparent communication, according to Habermas, can disguise 
ideology in science clothing.
62
 Ideology substitutes science by reducing 
practical questions about the implications of new technologies for people’s 
life to technical problems for experts. This leads to diminishing the 
importance of transparent public policy deliberation. As a result, 
technocratic elites can eliminate the need for public, democratic discussion 
of values in favour of ideology that masks the value-loaded nature of EU 
decision making in the field of GMOs. Therefore, the legitimate public 
interest in technical control plays a significant role in mitigating EU’s 
‘democratic deficit’,63 since the EU capacity of effective and democratic 
governance has often been challenged as lacking of representativeness, 
accountability and transparency.
64
 
 
 
2.3. The proportionality principle 
 
The restrictive measures imposed by Member States can be justified on the 
basis of Article 36 TFEU (ex Article 30 EC Treaty), if they were proved to 
be necessary and proportionate.
65
 The proportionality test implies that a 
national measure should not be prohibited as a restriction on trade if it is 
proportionate to the objective pursued and if there is no less restrictive 
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measure.
66
According to paragraph 2 Article 7 General Food Regulation, 
measures adopted in relation to the precautionary principle shall be 
proportionate and no more restrictive of trade than is required to achieve the 
high level of health protection chosen in the Community, regard being had 
to technical and economic feasibility and other factors regarded as 
legitimate in the matter under consideration. The measures shall be 
reviewed within a reasonable period of time, depending on the nature of the 
risk to life or health identified and the type of scientific information needed 
to clarify the scientific uncertainty and to conduct a more comprehensive 
risk assessment. 
Proportionality acts as a control tool over measures and actions falling 
within the sphere of application of EU law.
67
 The first legislative 
manifestation of proportionality can be considered Article 5 of EC Treaty 
where it was attributed to as part of subsidiarity.
68
 Nevertheless, the leading 
role in establishing and developing proportionality as one of the general 
principles of EU law has been played by EU courts. The principle of 
proportionality requires that measures adopted by EU institutions should not 
exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the 
legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation in question, and where there 
is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to 
the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate 
to the aims pursued.
69
 Therefore, the application of proportionality 
presupposes suitability and necessity of adopted measures in order to verify 
the legality of a national or EU measure. A particular expression of the 
principle of proportionality is the cost-benefit analysis
70
. Though the role of 
EU courts in applying the proportionality test is rather limited because EU 
‘judicature may not substitute its assessment of the facts for the assessment 
                                                 
66
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made by the authority concerned’,71 the courts verify whether the measure 
entailed disadvantages that were disproportionate to the objectives pursued. 
The proportionality test plays important role in the EU courts’ approach to 
national measures. In cases like Danish Bottles, Shmidberger, and Aher-
Waggon
72
 the proportionality test has been applied with a great deal of 
detail. Sometimes, like in PreussenElektra, Swedish Match, Arnold Andre, 
REACH cases
73
, the test application is rather superficial if not completely 
lacking. To a certain extent, it might have happened because the Court can 
extensively expand its own jurisdiction and employ a “generous” approach 
to interpretation of the EU law in order to enhance health and the 
environment protection. On the other hand, such approach makes it difficult 
to define the criteria under which a restrictive measure can be proved as 
necessary and proportionate. For example, in the so-called “snuss cases”74 
concerning a prohibition of tobacco for oral use in the EU, the Court found 
that ban justifiable on the basis of long-term objective of a tobacco-free 
world since “no other measure would have the same preventive effect in 
terms of the protection of health
75”. 
Apparently, the Court aspires to retain the opportunity to keep a balance 
between trade and environment on a case-to-case basis, since adoption of 
decisions in the field of environmental law have often involved complex 
political and economic choices. The common trend of the Court’s case law 
in the field of environment is that “the Court has displayed willingness to 
accept trade restrictive, and even discriminatory trade restrictive, measures 
where this complied with a positive environmental protection principle”76. 
Recognizing that environmental protection can be considered as a 
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mandatory requirement,
77
 which may be accepted as necessary for trade 
restriction through application of the proportionality test, the Court can also 
create a new justification, like in Walloon Waste case
78
 where an export ban 
on non-hazardous waste considered as non-discriminatory regarding the 
nature of goods, or in Toolex Alpha case where the Court invented a novel 
substitution principle
 
,
79
 under condition that no safer replacement product is 
available and provided that the applicant continues to seek alternative 
solutions which are less harmful to public health and the environment. 
The readiness to accept restrictive approach to free trade was recognized by 
EU courts insofar as the protection of public health ‘must take precedence 
over economic considerations’.80 At the same time, such prohibitive or 
restrictive measures should not ‘constitute a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States’.81 
Besides, a Member State has to provide evidence that a measure ‘is 
restricted to what is actually necessary to secure the protection of public 
health’.82 
Therefore, application of the proportionality principle implies that the 
objective of the adopted measure cannot be attained in a less restrictive 
manner. The proportionality principle allows policymakers and courts to 
assess scientific uncertainty than the need to protect health and environment 
must be balanced against the freedom of trade. In its essence, the 
proportionality principle is an effective legal tool of risk regulation. 
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2.3. Nature  of the precautionary principle 
within the framework of risk regulation 
 
The precautionary principle is a central concept of the EU regulatory 
framework and is a basis for the environment policy. In the field of health 
and environmental decision-making, ‘the precautionary principle is perhaps 
one of the most significant principles of the contemporary era’.83 This 
principle addresses the cases where scientific evidence is insufficient, 
inconclusive or uncertain and preliminary scientific evaluation indicates that 
there are the reasonable grounds for concern that potentially dangerous 
effects on the environment and health may be inconsistent with the high 
level of protection chosen by the EU.
84
 Risk regulation is designed to 
protect health and the environment from negative consequences of human 
action even when the expected negative effects are not yet proven by 
scientific results. Based on scientific risk assessment, decision makers 
define political objectives to determine the level of risk acceptable for the 
society, taking into account not only the results of risk assessment, but also 
the precautionary principle and other factors legitimate to the matter under 
consideration.
85
 
The precautionary principle is intended to improve rational design of public 
policy. The difference between risk assessment and risk management is 
framed within the theory of bounded rationality developed by Herbert 
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Simon
86
, where scientific expertise is substantive rationality prioritizing 
knowledge and answering the questions what is rational? Is the substance of 
this decision ‘rational’? Simultaneously, political decision-making is 
procedural-interactive rationality, concentrating on the questions how to 
deliberate? Who (how, and/or when) has to participate in the deliberation 
and decision-making process? 
The use of the precautionary principle in public policy deliberation involves 
balancing between value judgments and factual scientific statements in the 
public policy context.
87
  Risk regulation and precautionary principle are 
interconnected concepts of public policy. The links between these two 
concepts are described in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3. Deliberation level of application and implementation of the 
precautionary principle 
 
Stage of risk 
regulation 
Type of  
deliberation 
Operational  
framework 
Factors of risk 
regulation 
Decision model 
Assessment 
 
 
 
Scientific Risk  
assessment 
prior to  
authorization 
Preliminary 
scientific 
evaluation 
Allocation of  
burden of proof etc 
Assessment Scientific 
 
Scientific 
evidence 
identification,  
qualification 
of 
uncertainties 
Lack of 
knowledge, 
scientific  
controversy 
Scientific 
qualification of  
available  
information, 
quality of available 
data 
Management Societal Choice of 
level of  
protection  
Goal of high 
level of 
protection,  
consistency, 
non-
discrimination 
Defining adverse 
effects 
Management Societal Cost-benefit Balance Priority setting 
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 analysis between health/ 
environment 
protection and 
freedoms of 
internal market 
Management Political/ 
societal 
 
Application of 
precautionary  
practice 
 
Necessity and 
proportionality 
requirement, 
least restrictive  
measure 
Monitoring, limited  
licensing, labelling 
Communication 
 
Political/ 
societal 
 
Consensus 
over political 
debate, NGOs 
involvement 
Public concern, 
threat of adverse 
effects  
To act or not to act 
 
 
 
For the sake of precaution, different Member States disputed adequacy of 
legislation
88
 and opposed GMOs. Heavy reliance on expert authority rather 
than on deliberation policy led to the situation where little attention ‘has 
been paid to the interaction between civil society and the EU institutions 
from a deliberative perspective’.89 In 1990s, the protest against GMOs was 
intensive but hardly surprising and unreasonable. The tensions about 
agricultural biotechnologies ‘could hardly occur without wrenching political 
upheavals’.90 The consumer backlash against the technology was so intense 
that ‘the adequacy of the legislation was suspect even to a techno-
enthusiastic Europhile’91 A number of Member States blocked the 
authorization of any GM products for import and cultivation through the 
introduction of measures preventing access of GMOs to the national 
markets. This regulatory deadlock was de facto moratorium on the 
authorization of GMOs. Twelve out of the then fifteen Member States 
issued declarations that they were against the authorization in the 2194
th
 
Council Meeting during 24-25 June 1999. The declaration stated the 
Member States’ intention to block the authorization in Council. Ireland, 
Portugal and the UK did not join the declarations. From 1998 to 2004, no 
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applications for authorization of GMO were approved. Directive 
2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 March 2001 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically 
modified organisms repealed Council Directive 90/220/EEC. 
In the field of judiciary, EU courts developed the application of the 
precautionary principle. EU courts recognized that the ‘zero risk’ degree is 
practically unattainable and rejected a ‘purely hypothetical approach to the 
risk’92 therefore. The CFI in particular stated that ‘a “zero risk” does not 
exist, since it is not possible to prove scientifically that there is no current or 
future risk’93 associated with activity. The application of cost-benefits 
analysis is required as a part of the precautionary principle.
94
  
The Pfizer approach to interpretation of risk and scientific uncertainty set 
the tone for the subsequent judgments of EU courts. This approach proved 
to be rather restrictive, emphasizing the role of scientific evidence in legal 
analysis of risk. It acknowledges a possibility for scientific evidence to be a 
legitimate ground for justification of restriction on the freedom of trade for 
the sake of health protection: ‘To the extent to which the Community 
institution opts to disregard the [scientific] opinion, it must provide specific 
reasons for its findings by comparison with those made in the opinion and 
its statement of reasons must explain why it is disregarding the latter’.95 
There is a judicial preference for the evident objectivity and certainty of 
scientific information, over the politically stimulated value judgements 
concerning GMOs. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Decision Making within EU 
Regulation of GMOs 
 
 
 
This Chapter deals with the decision making process in the field of 
regulation of GMOs. I will scrutinize the regulatory concerns of GMOs 
outlined in the EU authorisation system. I will examine external challenges 
to EU regulation of GMOs exacerbated by trade conflicts with the US and 
other countries concerning the complaints that the EU does not comply with 
the WTO agreements. Besides, I will study the approach of EU courts to the 
environment and health protection measures banning or restricting GMOs, 
as well as the role of EU courts in risk assessment and interpretation of 
scientific evidence. 
 
  
3.1. Authorisation 
 
The main regulatory concern of GMOs is outlined in the authorisation 
regime. In fact, the EU authorisation regime is in force since 1990.
96
 At that 
time, GMO subjected itself to greater public scrutiny, leading to 
unprecedented raise of public awareness and making the GM food one of 
the greatest social challenges. This enormous social upheaval led to de facto 
moratorium (discussed in the previous chapter). The first regulatory 
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breakthrough was the Deliberate Release Directive
97
 of 2001, covering all 
GMOs for release into the environment or placing on the market. The Food 
and Feed Regulation
98
, and the Traceability and Labelling Regulation
99
 were 
adopted in 2003.  
The Deliberate Release Directive applies to the ‘placing on the market’ of 
GMOs ‘as or in products’.100 The Food and Feed Regulation applies to 
‘GMOs for food use’ or ‘food containing or consisting of GMOs’.101 The 
GMOs can be simultaneously covered by both legislative acts.  
It is commonly asserted that the so-called moratorium on authorization was 
ended by the authorization of Bt11 sweetcorn in May 2004.
102
 According to 
the present EU regulatory framework, a GM plant has to undergo proper 
environmental risk assessment before it can be cultivated in the EU, whereas 
an initial environmental risk assessment has to be carried out by a Member 
State. The burden of proof lies on the applicant. The applicant notifies the 
competent authority of the Member State where the GMO is to be placed on 
the market for the first time.
103
 The notification must contain a range of 
information, including the environmental risk assessment carried out by the 
applicant, and a plan for monitoring the GMO following its release into the 
environment.
104
 Environmental risk assessment of a GM plant consists of 
six steps defined by EFSA
105
.  
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Table 4. Environmental risk assessment approach for a GM plant
106
 
 
 
 
 
 
The applicants for authorization are required to monitor for possible 
environmental effects associated with the cultivation of GMOs. Next, they 
should report their findings to the other Member States and the 
Commission. EFSA examines the scientific quality of the environmental 
monitoring plan submitted by the applicants and issues a scientific opinion 
providing guidance to applicants.  
The new legislative framework for authorization of GMOs did not prevent 
many Member States from opposing to cultivation of GMOs on their 
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territories. The obstruction of GMOs authorizations obtained legal 
characteristics embodied in the form of safeguard measures. According to 
Article 23 of the Deliberate Release Directive, a Member States can invoke 
a safeguard measure if they wish to limit or prohibit the use and/or sale of 
GMOs for which authorisation has been granted on the basis of this 
Directive. A safeguard clause is a possibility for a Member State to prohibit 
provisionally the cultivation or use of GMO on its territory due to safety 
concerns based on scientific assessment. The Commission in turn may ask 
EFSA to provide scientific opinion on the information presented by a 
Member State, whereas EFSA assesses the information in the form of 
scientific opinion. Such a situation can potentially create a regulatory 
deadlock challenging the authority of the Commission. EFSA seeks for the 
way out of this situation by networking and consulting with national 
authorities and stakeholders. If the application is for the authorization of 
‘seeds or other plant propagating material’, EFSA ‘shall ask a national 
competent authority to carry out’ the environmental risk assessment.107 
According to Recital 5 in the preamble to Deliberate Release Directive, the 
protection of human health requires that due attention be given to 
controlling risks from the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment. 
Under Deliberate Release Directive, a specific case-by-case risk assessment 
has to be conducted for every envisaged GMO product. The precautionary 
principle must be taken into account in application of this directive.
108
 The 
national safeguard measures can be taken if the product granted the 
authorization can potentially cause a danger to human health or the 
environment according to the scientific evidence that has become available 
after the authorization date. The available evidence must affect ‘the 
environmental risk assessment or reassessment of existing information on 
the basis of new or additional scientific knowledge’.109  
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Thus, the problem of Member States’ opposition to GMOs still exists. 
Administrative stalemates create hurdles to free trade and to the functioning 
of internal market in general. The internal market freedoms constitute a 
framework for EU legal order. Therefore, the internal market can be 
perceived as an idea providing for the rationale of functioning of the EU. 
The barriers to the internal market can raise a threat to the very essence of 
the EU’s existence.  
The decision making for GMOs needs to be very sensitive therefore. Risk 
analysis is a matter of balance between different considerations involved 
into the issue of authorization of GMO. The decision maker faces a problem 
of correlation between science and law. Legal decision must be based on 
science. At the same time, legal decision has to take into consideration 
economic and political aspects, which are disregarded by natural science as 
a disciplinary field (presumably) free of value judgements. 
The authorisation process presumes that legal decision is taken on the basis 
of scientific evidence. The policy maker (the Commission) has to correlate 
science with law, deciding whether scientific expertise is prima facie 
relevant. Decision makers do not always consider scientific evidence as 
necessary and relevant. For example, Lena Wahlberg makes an example that 
during the recent years the courts have always ruled in favour of a patient 
irrespectively of the expert opinion that the injury was not a consequence of 
an accident. The reason is that causal links differ in the field of science and 
law.
110
  
The added value of science in decision making is that it allows autonomous 
stages of risk assessment and risk management to be linked to each other 
through the causal relations proved by factual evidence. 
The scientific evidence operates as the factual information that affects 
decision making rather than predetermines its outcome. Relevant facts are 
assessed in two different contexts: scientific and legal, subject to court 
review (Table 5).  
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Table 5. Assessment of facts in different contexts on EU level 
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, the decision-making is fulfilled by putting scientific risk 
assessment through legal assessment. The decisions on GMO authorisation 
are taken relatively autonomously from scientific risk assessment. On the 
one hand, such approach favours independence and impartiality of scientific 
expertise. On the other hand, the division between risk assessment and risk 
management shifts the responsibility for decision making from those who 
possess expert knowledge about potential harm of GMOs (EFSA) to those 
who certainly do not have scientific expertise and are not free from bias and 
value judgment (the Commission).  
In any case, there is no ideal situation in the real word. It is generally 
asserted that ‘law’, ‘science’, and ‘politics’ are autonomous fields, whereas 
in the area of regulation of GM food ‘the demarcation between these fields 
EFSA - 
expertise 
Commission 
- decision 
making 
Fact 
EU courts - 
judicial 
review 
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is blurry’.111 The practice shows that such a division of responsibility 
proved to be a positive and useful tool for decision making in the field of 
GMOs. Separation between scientific and managerial aspects of GMOs’ 
authorisation helps the decision making to be backed up by the scientific 
data without giving the science responsibility for the final decision for lack 
of legitimacy. It is still a question whether the Commission’s democratic 
legitimacy is solid enough to be able to withstand critical considerations of 
its activity. Scientific expertise is required for the establishing of legal 
causal relations where legal facts are based on scientific facts. At the same 
time, scientific facts and legal facts are not necessarily the same thing. 
Therefore, legally relevant facts are given priority within decision-making 
process by reasons that scientifically relevant information may be legally 
irrelevant. Nevertheless, a legal decision that rejects scientific information 
must be well-grounded by the reasons which ‘must be of a scientific level at 
least commensurate with that of the opinion in question’.112 
 
 
3.2. The challenges to EU regulation of 
GMOs beyond European context 
 
The GMOs debate has  taken place not only in the context of EU legal order 
but also in the international context. Since the EU’s approach towards risk 
regulation in the field of GMO comes into conflict with WTO law, it is 
worthy to examine the extent to which the EU is capable to regulate 
biotechnology within the EU. 
                                                 
111
 Etty, T., Somsen, H., (2004). Case C-236/01: Monsanto Agricoltura Italia SpA and Others 
v Presidenza Del Consiglio dei Ministeri and Others. European Environmental Law 
Review. Jan2004, Vol. 13 Issue 1, pp. 3-18. 
112
 Pfizer, supra note 69, paragraph 199. 
41 
 
Comparison of the EU with the US, as another major representative of 
Western civilization and main antagonist of the EU in the WTO,
113
 shows a 
different understanding of risks in health and environment policy. In 
contrast to the EU, the US push forward the cost-benefit analysis.
114
 In 
practice, this may lead to different policy actions. For example, in the EU 
the consequences of use of GMOs are uncertain and a question of their risks 
is open, hence the European policy on GMOs is quite restrictive. By 
contrast, the US estimate the benefits as overweighing the probable harms 
and the public policy on genetic engineering is therefore supportive. The 
cost-benefit analysis application in the US’ style tends to monetize 
everything, including human life. It has even been stated that the US 
Environmental Protection Agency values a human life at about $6.1 
million.
115
 It seems unlikely that similar calculations could be acceptable in 
the EU. The difference between regulation policies of the US and the EU are 
striking.
116
 Nearly three-quarters of all genetically modified crops are grown 
in the US, whereas comparably small quantities are grown in Europe. 
Unlike the US, in Europe the public opposition to GMOs has been relatively 
effective
117
. In any case, a conflict between the EU and the US diminishes 
effectiveness of rules, inducing further expansion of conflict and thereby 
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reducing the opportunity to promote an optimal relationship between 
science and society in the future
118
. A sensible methodological approach is 
significant because the validity of scientific data is not always able to handle 
all challenges of the question at issue. The rational policy making, dealing 
with the question of a clash between trade and environment, rules out the 
solutions driven by prejudice. Thus, the statement that the environmental 
protection has a negative impact on international competitiveness of the EU 
since it places an additional burden on the internal market freedoms is 
probably erroneous. Such a position can be a hasty conclusion tending to 
dramatic and dichotomous judgment. Besides, this opinion has been 
challenged by so-called Porter hypothesis, according to which more 
stringent environmental policies can stimulate innovations that may 
compensate for the costs of complying with these policies
119
. The linkage 
between trade and environment is “a matter of fact... Environmental rules 
cannot be seen simply as pollution control or natural resource management 
standards; they also provide the ground rules for international commerce 
and serve as an essential bulwark against market failure in the international 
economic system”.120  
The WTO develops its trade liberalization regime through the concept of 
prohibition of discrimination
121
. Non-discrimination is also provided for in 
several articles of the TFEU, for example, in Article 36. Nevertheless, both 
for the WTO and the EU, the most disputable and complicated issue is the 
removal of non-discriminatory restrictions to trade.  
The trade conflict between WTO and EU revolves around the question 
whether the environmental protective measures constitute possible non-
discriminatory restrictions on trade, and if so, how they can be removed. 
The EU has developed an efficient approach to non-discriminatory 
restrictions through the harmonisation process with an outstanding 
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contribution of the ECJ. It appears that the WTO would have benefitted 
from the EU experience of harmonization. It was suggested that the WTO 
could gain much from adopting a proportionality test developed by the 
Court, according to which a national measure should not be prohibited as a 
restriction on trade if it is proportionate to the objective pursued and if there 
is no less restrictive measure
122
. On the other hand, WTO as an international 
regime is committed uppermost to trade liberalization and the possibilities 
to interfere with a national legal system do not seem to be strong, while the 
EU law provides for broad opportunities for close integration of the 
European legal system with a national legal system. 
In 2003, the US, joined by co-complainants Canada and Argentina, filed a 
suit against the EU before the WTO, challenging the EU's de facto 
moratorium and its various safeguard measures. In November 2006, the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body adopted the WTO panel's ruling in the case, 
which was largely in favour of the complainants.
123
 The main point of 
criticism regarding EU regulation of GMOs is that the Court does not 
recognize the direct effect of WTO law. The position of the ECJ opposes 
resolutely to a possibility to invoke WTO law in order to challenge the 
lawfulness of the EU measures. In particular, the Court stated that ‘the WTO 
agreements are not, in principle, among the rules in the light of which the 
Court is to review the legality of measures adopted by the Community 
institutions.’124 The Court’s approach is criticized as illogical and 
inconsequent because of its inconsistency with other cases where the Court 
has given direct effect to provisions of Community trade agreements
125
. On 
the other hand, the US also refuses to recognize direct effect of WTO law
126
. 
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Thus, there is a risk of subjecting the Court to rules of another conflicting 
jurisdiction that would compromise the EU legal system. 
EU regulation of GMOs tries to learn from the US mistakes. For example, in 
the US ‘StarLink’ maize was approved only as an animal feed because of 
scientific uncertainty about its possible harm on human health. 
Nevertheless, the traces of this maize were soon revealed in human food 
chain, causing huge public scandal, product withdrawals, and losses for the 
producer. The EU provided for a possibility of such risks by demanding all 
authorized GMOs to meet the requirements for both food and feed. 
According to Food and Feed Regulation, ‘experience has shown that 
authorisation should not be granted for a single use, when a product is likely 
to be used for food and feed purposes; therefore such products should only 
be authorised when fulfilling the criteria for both food and feed’.127  
It is only where the Community has intended to implement a particular 
obligation assumed in the context of the WTO (Nakajima exception), or 
where the Community measure refers expressly to the precise provisions of 
the WTO agreements (Fediol exception), that it is for the Court to review 
the legality of the Community measure in question in the light of the WTO 
rules
128
. In some instances, the circumstances of a case before the Court do 
not correspond to either of these two hypotheses, for example, in Biret 
cases
129
. Biret, a French meat trading company, sought indemnification for 
alleged damages suffered as a result of the Community import ban on 
hormone-treated meat and meat products. Biret asked the Court to hold the 
Community liable for failing to implement the decision within the 
prescribed period. The Court of First Instance initially rejected the claim on 
the ground that neither WTO agreements nor rulings could create rights for 
private individuals.  In the appeal, the Court dismissed the action on factual 
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grounds, but did not rule that the plaintiff’s claim was unfounded. In this 
way, the Court left open the possibility to invoke a WTO ruling condemning 
the Community as a basis for claiming damages before the Court
130
. It is 
interesting that Advocate General in his opinion recommended the Court to 
recognize a claim for damages based on infringement of the WTO law, 
where the Community has failed to implement a binding award of the WTO 
dispute settlement body within the prescribed period. 
Thus, EU risk regulation relates to the WTO legal system through generic 
characteristics of risks pertaining to biotechnologies in a global context. 
Both the WTO and the EU mutually influence each other. The EU regime 
on GMOs crosses over WTO rules on trade liberalization. Therefore, 
development of the EU regulation of GMOs effects on the US as the EU’s 
main antagonist in WTO, and vice versa.
131
 
 
 
3.3. Role of EU courts in risk assessment 
and interpretation of scientific 
evidence 
 
In this section, I will examine relevant case law in order to explain how EU 
courts assess scientific uncertainty through interpretation of the principles of 
precautionary, necessity and proportionality. 
In general, EU courts’ case law extensively endorses ‘risk-analysis 
theory’132 as a primary methodological approach to health and environment 
risks regulation. Science plays a particularly prominent role in this 
approach. Generally, any activity, brought up before EU courts, requires 
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scientific justification.
133
 While scientific evidence can considerably 
facilitate decision making, there are still many science-related questions not 
fully addressed by EU regulation of GMOs. Since the EU legislation is 
silent on some questions,
134
 the jurisprudence might be a relevant source of 
information. Some issues have already been interpreted by EU courts, while 
others are still covered in uncertainty. Undoubtedly all the relevant issues 
are worthy of thorough examination. Nevertheless, the aim of this section is 
to elaborate on the way in which EU courts interpret scientific evidence and 
scientific uncertainty. 
The precautionary principle plays a prominent role in the interpretation by 
EU courts of scientific uncertainty as a legitimate ground for restrictions of 
freedom of movement of goods. EU courts understand the precautionary 
principle as meaning that ‘where there is uncertainty as to the existence or 
extent of risks to human health, protective measures may be taken without 
having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those risks become fully 
apparent’.135 Pfizer case shows a noteworthy fact: before the establishment 
of EFSA, the Commission had sometimes assessed scientific uncertainty on 
its own. For example, the Commission had assessed risks either without 
consulting with the relevant expert committee
136
 or without following its 
advice. EU courts deem it possible to adopt a preventive measure without 
consulting with scientists in ‘exceptional situations’.137 
Although EU courts have a broad scope of powers in interpretation of risks 
in EU law, the ECJ itself states that it observes whether there has been a 
‘manifest error or a misuse of powers or whether the Community 
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institutions clearly exceeded the bounds of their discretion’.138 In practice, 
EU courts primarily interpret the implications of scientific uncertainty for 
national measures seeking higher level of protection. In some cases, the ECJ 
has condemned a Member State for non-compliance with harmonization 
measure.
139
 Though in such cases the EU courts have successfully precluded 
derogations of the freedoms of internal market, they did not prevent the 
Member States from the practice of ‘supporting the moratorium on all GM 
products from using the safeguard clause for purely political reasons’.140 
A Member State can adopt a prohibition or restriction only if ‘the situation 
is likely to constitute a clear and serious risk to human health, animal health 
or the environment’.141 While scientific risk assessment is the core of EU 
approach to the precautionary principle, the Commission and courts conduct 
a careful consideration of scientific uncertainties. Decision making in the 
field of GMOs allows for a broad input of non-scientific factors. The effect 
of the precautionary principle on decision making on GM products has a 
specific expression in safeguard clause,
142
 which requires scientific 
uncertainty to be taken into account when assessing the national safeguard 
measure. With regards to the safeguard clause, paragraph 1 Article 23 of 
Deliberate Release Directive provides: ‘Where a Member State, as a result 
of new or additional information made available since the date of the 
consent and affecting the environmental risk assessment or reassessment of 
existing information on the basis of new or additional scientific knowledge, 
has detailed grounds for considering that a GMO as or in a product which 
has been properly notified and has received written consent under this 
Directive constitutes a risk to human health or the environment, that 
Member State may provisionally restrict or prohibit the use and/or sale of 
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that GMO as or in a product on its territory’. Article 34 of Food and Feed 
Regulation, entitled ‘Emergency measures’, contains a similar provision: 
‘Where it is evident that products authorised by or in accordance with this 
Regulation are likely to constitute a serious risk to human health, animal 
health or the environment, …, measures shall be taken under the procedures 
provided for in Articles 53 and 54 of Regulation [No 178/2002].’  
In Monsanto SAS and others, the Court has declared the distinction between 
the scope of application of measures adopted under Article 23 of Deliberate 
Release Directive and Article 34 of Food and Feed Regulation. In case 
where GMOs were notified as existing products and were subsequently the 
subject of a pending application for renewal of authorisation, a restrictive or 
prohibitive measure may be adopted pursuant to Article 34 of Food and 
Feed Regulation. On the other hand, if GMOs are new products, a Member 
State may have their use or sale provisionally suspended or prohibited under 
Article 23 of Deliberate Release Directive. 
143
 
A protective measure cannot be based on a purely hypothetical approach to 
the risk, founded on assumptions which have not yet been scientifically 
verified. The national courts have jurisdiction to assess the existence of such 
a risk, except where a decision has been adopted at Union level pursuant to 
Article 53 of General Food Regulation
144
. The factual and legal assessments 
contained in such a decision are binding on all bodies of the Member State 
concerned, including its courts. In this way, the assessment and management 
of serious and evident risk ultimately come under the responsibility of the 
Commission and the Council, subject to review by EU Courts. The Court is 
aimed to reconcile contraries of either purely science-based decision making 
or a highly politicised precautionary rhetoric involving emotion 
discourse.
145
 This tactics insures that the precautionary principle is not used 
for justification of irrational non-legal reasons. 
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Scientific credibility of risk evaluation and risk management in relation to 
protective measures has been often challenged by non-legal reasons. In 
Commission v Poland
146
, the question at issue was a Polish law prohibiting 
marketing of GMO. This case is of particular interest because the Polish 
government grounded the prohibition on the ethical and religious 
considerations. Polish government stated that the most members of Polish 
Parliament who passed the contested law were guided by Roman Catholic 
values, which are prevalent in society and shared by the electorate, rather 
than by considerations related to the environment or public health, which are 
scientifically complex and more difficult to understand
147
. This prohibition 
barred from marketing the GMO varieties authorized by the EU authorities, 
which was in breach of Deliberate Release Directive and Directive 
2002/53
148
. In this case, public morality was not invoked as a separate 
justification, but as an aspect of the justification relating to protection of 
human health and the environment, which is precisely the concern of 
Deliberate Release Directive
 149
. According to the case law, a Member State 
cannot rely on the views of public opinion in order to challenge unilaterally 
a harmonising measure adopted by the Community institutions
150
. As the 
Court previously observed, a Member State may not plead difficulties of 
implementation that emerge at the stage when a Community measure is put 
into effect, such as difficulties relating to opposition on the part of certain 
individuals, to justify a failure to comply with obligations and time-limits 
laid down by Community law
151
. 
Ultimately, the Court declared that the general prohibition laid down in the 
contested national law infringes the obligations of Poland under the 
aforementioned Directives. Nonetheless, the Court has not explicitly stated 
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whether a Member State could impose a trade restriction based on ethical 
and/or religious grounds. Nor it analysed a range of extension of public 
morality to environmental concerns. Thus, the question is open for ‘public 
deliberation at a local level where, if a state or locality comes to a view that 
an EU law poses insurmountable ethical or religious difficulties for it, and it 
wishes to protect a domestic provision on this ground, it might be not 
incompatible with EU law’.152 It is noteworthy that both public morality and 
environmental protection fall under a broad definition of public policy. 
Apparently, interrelation between environmental interests and political as 
well as ethical (moral, religious) aspects of free trade deserve a separate 
thorough investigation. So far, the grounds of public morality, public policy 
or public security might be used to maintain national provisions after the 
adoption of a harmonisation measure. At the same time, such situations 
are not expressly provided for in EU law, so it is doubtful that they might be 
the legal grounds for a prohibition or restriction on the cultivation of GMOs.  
Besides political reasons unrelated to considerations of protection of human 
health or the environment, some Member States tried to impede free 
movement of GMOs by bureaucratic procedures. In Pioneer
153
 case, Italian 
Ministry of Agricultural, Food and Forestry Policies adopted national 
measures prohibiting cultivation of GMOs accepted for inclusion in the 
common catalogue and authorised as existing products pending the adoption 
by the regions of rules to ensure the coexistence of conventional, organic 
and genetically modified crops. The ECJ considered that such a measure 
would run counter to the system implemented by Food and Feed Regulation 
and Deliberate Release Directive. Authorisation of GMOs at EU level and 
acceptance for inclusion in the common catalogue ensure the immediate free 
movement of products, once the requirements of protection of health and the 
environment have been taken into consideration during the authorisation and 
acceptance procedures. Therefore, the Court ruled that the cultivation of 
GMOs cannot be made subject to a national authorisation procedure when 
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the use and marketing of those varieties are authorised pursuant to 
Regulation No 1829/2003 and those varieties have been accepted for 
inclusion in the common catalogue provided for in Directive 2002/53. 
Besides, the ECJ stated that Directive 2001/18 does not entitle a Member 
State to prohibit in a general manner the cultivation on its territory of GMOs 
pending the adoption of coexistence measures to avoid the unintended 
presence of GMOs in other crops.
154
 
Errors or contradictions of risk management can challenge the legitimacy of 
European institutions. For example, an expert opinion of European Food 
Safety Agency sometimes contradicts to the views of WHO and European 
Medicines Agency. Therefore, the credibility of EU regulation of GMOs has 
been often questioned and heavily criticized. Authorization based on 
unsubstantiated or deficient risk assessment can question the legitimacy of 
the Commission. The GMOs authorisation has often involved complex 
political and economic choices capable to undermine scientific credibility of 
environmental policy. It is obvious that decision-making process is largely 
political. In case T-240/10,
155
 concerning authorization of a genetically 
modified potato for cultivation in Europe, the question was whether the 
potato may confer resistance to certain antibiotics to consumers through the 
food chain and whether these antibiotics are actually or potentially used in 
human medicine. According to EFSA’s opinion, it was very unlikely that 
the potato cultivation may confer antibiotic resistance to humans and that 
the concerned antibiotics were not important for human and veterinary 
medicine. This opinion served as a basis for the Commission’s decision 
granting authorization to the product. The EFSA’s conclusion was 
contradictory to the views held in this matter by the World Health 
Organization, the World Organization for Animal Health and the European 
Medicines Agency, which published a report identifying concerned 
antibiotics as very important. As a consequence, many Hungarian 
politicians, NGOs, and individuals raised objections to the effect that the 
authorization, regarding the objectives to guarantee a high level of 
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protection of the environment and health, could cause damage to the health 
of humans and animals and to the environment. Nevertheless, EFSA did not 
reverse its opinion. Therefore, the EFSA’s credibility was questioned and 
heavily criticized as to the point that the authorization based on 
unsubstantiated or deficient risk assessment has implications for the legality 
of the Commission. In this regard, new available evidence challenges the 
credibility of previous empirical grounds for scientific decision. Ultimately, 
it is up to the General Court to resolve the problem and the decision on the 
question at issue is likely to be a stepping stone in the way of evolution of 
EU environmental law. Besides, this decision promises to be a challenge to 
the obligation to ensure a high level of protection for health and the 
environment. It is difficult to predict the verdict of judges issued on a case 
to case basis, but if we look for the cases where different scientific opinions 
exists, it is evident that the rulings of EU courts are not consistent on the 
different levels of judicial review. For example, in Commission v CEVA the 
ECJ stated that ‘the Court of First Instance is none the less obligated to 
provide reasons which will allow the Court to exercise its judicial review. 
Those reasons must make it possible for the Court to review any distortion 
of the evidence submitted to the Court of First Instance’.156 In this case, the 
Commission stressed before the CFI the differences between the opinions of 
the CVMP, the SCVPH, the JECFA and the IARC. These differences were 
in fact ‘divergent and in some respects conflicting scientific information.’157 
As a result, the ECJ set aside the CFI judgment based on an opinion of ‘the 
CVMP without explaining why the Commission was obliged to follow that 
opinion, and disregarded the differing opinions from other sources’.158 
By analogy to the case law like Phizer and Alpharma, it is possible to 
surmise that in Hungary v Commission the General Court could interpret 
scientific uncertainty in favour of the precautionary principle and could rule 
out for the claimant taking into account the available scientific 
contradictions. 
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Any restrictive activity usually requires scientific evidence. In case of a 
safeguard measure, new scientific evidence is required. A Member State 
applying stricter national measure must refer to such evidence. According to 
paragraph 5 Article 114 TFEU (ex Article 95 TEU), if a Member State 
deems it necessary to introduce national provisions based on new scientific 
evidence relating to the protection of the environment or the working 
environment on grounds of a problem specific to that Member State arising 
after the adoption of the harmonisation measure, it shall notify the 
Commission of the envisaged provisions as well as the grounds for 
introducing them.  
 
 
Table 6. Conditions for application of Article 114(5) TFEU. 
 
 
1 New evidence must be presented. 
2 The evidence must be scientific. 
3 It must relate to protection of the environment or the working 
environment. 
4 There must be a problem specific to the Member State. 
5 The problem must have been arisen after the adoption of the 
harmonising measure. 
 
 
There are two possible interpretations of new scientific evidence 
requirement: broad and narrow
159
. The narrow approach takes into account 
data generated after a harmonisation measure came into force, whereas the 
broad approach takes into account all relevant knowledge, including 
information available at the time of adoption of a measure (Table 7). 
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Table 7. Interpretations of new scientific evidence requirement.  
 
 
 
 
 
The EU courts interpret new scientific evidence requirement in the narrow 
sense. The courts therefore have to define whether the relevant information 
occurred before or after the moment of time when a harmonisation measure 
came into force. 
In Land Oberösterreich, the ECJ rejected the scientific report dated before 
the harmonization measure since it ‘did not provide any new information 
capable of calling into question the provisions’160 of Deliberate Release 
Directive. In order to substantiate the national prohibition on GMOs, 
Austria invoked the precautionary principle before the CFI and ECJ. The 
ECJ rejected the application of the precautionary principle as the national 
measure did not comply with the requirements that the measure must be 
substantiated by a new scientific evidence specific to that Member State. 
The ECJ did not elaborate on what the characteristics of ‘new scientific 
evidence’ are. The Court stated that ‘the introduction of new national 
provisions must be based on new scientific evidence relating to the 
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protection of the environment or the working environment by reason of a 
problem specific to that Member State arising after the adoption of the 
harmonisation measure’.161 AG Sharpston mentioned that ‘evidence’ 
normally designates the raw material from which conclusions may be 
drawn
162
. She concluded that those new conclusions drawn from existing 
data may constitute new scientific evidence within the meaning of Article 
95(5) EC.
163
 The requirement of ‘specific to the Member State’ criterion is 
also left unresolved. The ECJ did not assess this issue because the 
conditions for application of Article 95(5) are cumulative. Therefore, this 
criterion was not assessed by the Court since Austria failed to fulfil the 
previous criterion of new scientific data. 
Land Oberösterreich is not the first case where Austria failed to provide 
new scientific evidence as possibly justifiable reason for national measure. 
In Greenpeace,
164
 Austria provided a scientific report in support of its 
safeguard measure on maize. The court rejected that report as not presenting 
new scientific evidence. Besides, Austria had also provided an opinion poll 
signed by one fifth of population, also rejected by the ECJ. 
In Land Oberösterreich, Austria unsuccessfully claimed that the issue of 
coexistence of GMOs and natural crops is a problem specific to Austria. The 
court rejected this argument because this problem is general for the present 
public debates about GMOs rather than unique for Austria only. This issue 
was emphasized in Bablok,
165
 where German beekeepers sued the Bavarian 
government after their honey was unintentionally contaminated by pollen 
from a MON8io GM maize.  
Therefore, it is impossible to invoke higher level of protection relying on the 
precautionary principle if a measure is not supported by new scientific data. 
The ECJ considers safeguard provisions as closely related to application of 
the precautionary principle. The Court states that ‘Article 34 of Regulation 
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No 1829/2003 on genetically modified food and feed requires Member 
States to establish, in addition to urgency, the existence of a situation which 
is likely to constitute a clear and serious risk to human health, animal health 
or the environment. That risk must be established on the basis of new 
evidence based on reliable scientific data. Protective measures adopted 
under Article 34 of Regulation No 1829/2003 cannot validly be based on a 
purely hypothetical approach to the risk, founded on mere assumptions 
which have not yet been scientifically verified. On the contrary, such 
protective measures, notwithstanding their temporary character and even if 
they are preventive in nature, may be adopted only if they are based on a 
risk assessment as complete as possible in the particular circumstances of an 
individual case, which indicate that those measures are necessary’.166 
In conclusion, the analysis of relevant case law shows that when EU courts 
assess whether EU law precludes application of restrictive measure, they 
examine the legality of measure by the principles of precautionary and 
proportionality, if the causal relation between GMOs and possible risks is 
proved to be true. If such a causal relation is not established, courts reject a 
measure as not proved by facts and precluded by EU law. 
The Court has interpreted the existence of a situation which is ‘likely’ to 
constitute a ‘serious risk’ as referring to a significant risk which clearly 
jeopardises human health, animal health or the environment. That risk must 
be established on the basis of new evidence based on reliable scientific data. 
Ethical or socioeconomic considerations are generally not permitted by EU 
courts as a justification. The precautionary principle demands risk 
assessment to be based on scientific evidence. The principle of 
precautionary designates low tolerance for any potential adverse effects of 
GMOs, although seeking ‘zero risk’ is not generally allowed by EU law as 
based on ‘purely hypothetical approach to risk’. Besides, scholars have 
generally accepted the inevitability of uncertain risks in the debates on 
GMOs, suggesting that it is not uncertainty but rather the experts’ inability 
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to acknowledge uncertainty that causes problems.
167
 At the same time, 
attempts seeking to reduce identified risk to zero are highly desirable.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
The present research analyses the amount and weight of the evidence that 
have to be adduced in EU decision making on GMOs. Risk regulation is the 
prevailing theoretical concept for EU environmental decision making. 
Scientific evidence is the core aspect of EU regulation of GMOs. EU 
environmental law assigns a particular role to science. Any restrictive 
measure on basis of health and environment protection usually requires 
justification substantiated by scientific evidence. 
To sum up, the approach of EU courts to the environment and health 
protection measures banning GMOs looks as follows. A protection measure 
can be acknowledged as justified by evident risk to health and environment. 
The necessary conditions for such measure are: 
- absence of less restrictive measure; 
- a protection measure must prove to be necessary to reach the 
goal of protection of health and the environment;  
- a measure must be based on scientific evidence.  
In the field of environmental law, the doctrine of risk regulation is 
concerned with the governance of risks to health and safety, weighed up 
against economic interests such as the cost of regulatory measures and their 
potential negative impact on trade. In other words, a health protection 
measure can affect trade negatively, as well as trade liberalisation can affect 
health protection interests. 
Errors or contradictions of risk management can challenge the legitimacy of 
European institutions. For example, an expert opinion of European Food 
Safety Agency sometimes contradicts to the views of WHO and European 
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Medicines Agency.
168
 Therefore, the credibility of EU regulation of GMOs 
has been often questioned and heavily criticized. Authorization based on 
unsubstantiated or deficient risk assessment questions the legitimacy of the 
Commission. The GMOs authorisation has often involved complex political 
and economic choices capable to undermine scientific credibility of the 
environment and health policy. 
Science is considered as the prime source of authority in EU decision-
making on agricultural biotechnology. Policymakers and courts are aimed to 
reconcile inconsistencies between purely science-based decision-making 
and highly politicised rhetoric. In other words, they aim at striking a balance 
between scientific and political legitimacy. The precautionary principle 
plays a prominent role in keeping this balance. Risk to health or 
environment must be established on the basis of new evidence based on 
reliable scientific data. Case law illustrates how the courts interpret the role 
of scientific evidence and uncertainty in legitimising barriers to free trade. 
A possibility of Member States to invoke safeguard measures in order to 
block GMOs in their territory depends on their ability to base higher level of 
protection on relevant scientific evidence. 
As Advocate General Mengozzi noted, the safeguard clauses, such as 
Article 23 of Deliberate Release Directive and Article 34 of Food and Feed 
Regulation, are expressions of the precautionary principle.
169
 The 
precautionary principle which is enshrined in Article 191(2) TFEU, means, 
according to settled case-law, that ‘[w]here there is uncertainty as to the 
existence or extent of risks …, the institutions may take protective measures 
without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those risks 
become fully apparent’.170 
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The scientific evidence acts as a tool substantiating alternatives for decision 
making, and impacts the distribution of cost and benefits of a taken decision 
between politicians, public officials, producers, consumers. Risks inherent 
in EU regulation of GMOs are distributed between different actors during 
the decision making process. The burden of proof is shifted between 
different stakeholders. On the other hand, one may note that the 
responsibility for authorization of GMO can also be shared, which can 
challenge the legitimacy of the EU.  
The scientific risk assessment of GMOs is a matter of weighing evidence, a 
principle inherent in every empirical science. The rejection of purely 
hypothetical approach to the risk by EU courts has a practical meaning. Any 
interested party that wishes to bring science into the GMOs dispute must 
refer to established facts supported by scientific evidence. EU courts avoid 
interpretation of ethical grounds for restrictive measures, assessing the 
collective weight of the quantitative data (i.e., that most evidence points 
away from health risk), and living no room for a hypothetical qualitative 
conclusion (i.e., that health risk has not been absolutely proven to be 
reduced to ‘zero’). 
The role of science in environmental decision making is that it allows 
autonomous stages of risk assessment and risk management to be linked to 
each other through the causal relations proved by factual evidence. At the 
same time, science and law view uncertainty and risks to health and the 
environment differently, and this issue is far from resolved
171
. EU courts 
avoid providing definitions of scientific evidence and uncertainty. Besides 
the reason of lack of natural science expertise, such laissez-faire policy in 
relation to scientific risk assessment can also be driven by considerations of 
risk management. There is no doubt that the Commission bears a primary 
responsibility for management of potential risks of goods and services for 
health and environment. EU courts, however, play an important corrective 
role, assessing and mitigating potential negative effects of business 
operations on health and environment. Both the system of GMOs’ 
authorization and the judicial decision making on GMOs have implication 
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for health and the environment, quite often causing serious consequences to 
manufacturers and importers, including a prohibition of import and sales. It 
is understandable that, once the state of the art in EU regulation of GMOs 
has been achieved ‘upon at the expense of a great amount of time, energy, 
and negotiation process, the Commission will display little enthusiasm for 
initiatives that have the potential to destabilise these hard-fought’172 status 
quo, even if the system is not perfect, until it functions. 
Contradictions regarding decision making in the field of GMOs is an 
unavoidable fact since scientific uncertainty potentially is a characteristic 
feature of all the varieties of biotechnologies. Such uncertainty is 
exacerbated by a possibility of decision to be based on non-objective 
criteria. It is still unclear, and the analysed case law remains silent on this 
question, how EU regulation of GMOs should respond to possible changes 
of scientific information that serves as empirical grounds for risk 
management and decision making in the field of EU policy on health and 
the environment. 
It is apparent that the EU courts’ approach to prohibitive and/or restrictive 
measures can employ, among others, a reasoning based on administrative 
feasibility and the EU policy objectives, especially with regard to such 
politically sensitive issue as GMOs. The Court refrains from interfering in 
purely scientific debates in order to maintain a subtle balance between trade 
and environment. It is up to an interested party to bear a burden of proof 
concerning legal relevance of scientific evidence and acceptability of risks.  
For example, an application for market placement of GMO for food use 
must show that food does not have adverse effects on health and 
environment. Regarding the nationa measurea, a Member State can adopt a 
prohibition or restriction only if the situation is likely to constitute a clear 
and serious risk to human health or the environment. 
Scientific evidence operates as factual information which affects decision 
making rather than predetermines its outcome. Relevant facts are assessed in 
two different contexts: scientific and legal, subject by court review. Hence 
EFSA has a competence to establish scientific validity of facts by its 
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expertise, the Commission establishes legal facts by decision making 
process, EU courts conduct judicial review of causal relations between 
scientific and legal facts by application of the principles of precautionary 
and proportionality. In view of the case law concerning EU regulation of 
GMOs, EU courts tend to frame the risks pertinent to GMOs with priority to 
the legal context of assessment of the relevant facts without deep 
engagement with the content of science. Meanwhile, scientific context is 
instrumental in establishing causal relation between factual information and 
decision making. For example, when EU courts assess whether application 
of restrictive measure is precluded by EU law, they examine the legality of 
measure against the principles of precautionary and proportionality, if the 
causal relation between GMOs and possible risks is proved to be true. If 
such a causal relation is not established, courts reject a measure as not 
proved by facts and precluded by EU law. Nevertheless, the application to 
national derogations of the ‘other legitimate factors’ criterion suggest a 
possibility for decision to go beyond scientific evidence in risk assessment. 
The conflict between the freedom of movement of goods and the protection 
of health and the environments needs to be reconciled. At present, the 
European institutions try to address public opposition to GMOs by 
proposing relevant legislative changes. The adjustments to the existing 
legislation would favour more national autonomy. For example, on 13 July 
2010 the Commission issued a proposal to amend Directive 2001/18
173
. The 
proposal emphasizes the need for more flexibility on GMO cultivation. This 
proposal expands the available justifications for restrictive measures. 
Member States would carry out their own assessments to justify their 
decisions about cultivation of GMOs in their territories at national or 
regional levels. The amendment of the legislation would support the 
legitimacy of EU system of authorisations based on the scientific 
assessment of health and environmental risks. Besides, Member States 
would be granted freedom to address specific local issues raised by the 
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cultivation of GMOs. Therefore, this approach could push the boundaries 
acceptable for the internal market, while preserving EU authorisation system 
of GMOs as well as the free circulation and import of GMOs. 
Ongoing policy debates suggest that progress of biotechnologies is an 
inevitable fact in witness of socio-economic development. New 
technologies can be affected by experience from previous technologies. 
Industrial and medical biotechnologies can be addressed by the tools that 
proved effective for agricultural biotechnology. For example, the 
agricultural biotechnology experience can secure constructive scientific 
discussion of nanotechnology. Therefore, the understanding of legally 
relevant facts established by scientific evidence provides decision makers 
with the tools for balancing the interests of trade and health protection. 
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